



The Ascendancy of China in 21st Century: perspectives under the notion of peaceful development

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Abstract

China is building good relations with the international community, developing diplomatic route paths on the basis of economy, investing high amounts of dollars to capture all leading markets of world. China undoubtedly can be in leading position after few years. The big projects named as BRI, Silk road route, SCO, AIIB, are the masterpieces of China to consider it as rising China. Its good relations with big powers like US, Russia and European Union are indication of its peaceful rise towards big power. on the other side Beijing is busy to strengthen its military by making it power full day by day. All the indicators of China's economy, diplomacy, politics and military factors are enough to prove that China is rising peacefully and her rise is no danger for the rest of the world.

Keywords: China, Ascendancy, Peaceful development, perspectives, Regional.

Introduction

This discourse highlights the rise of China and its engagement with the tenets of the liberal framework amidst a period of significant uncertainty over its prospects and sustainability. The central inquiry pertains to China's response to liberal institutions and established rules of the international order, given its growing power and projected global leadership. This analysis examines whether China is contesting these institutions and rules, or alternatively, seeking to establish new pathways, and the diverse approaches it employs in doing so. This introduction to the Forum presents three primary themes based on the submissions. The Forum initially highlights the potential for a third scenario in China's engagement with liberal actors, institutions, and laws. This alternative perspective challenges the conventional binary framework of either inevitable conflict or integration commonly found in discussions within the field of international relations. This nuanced scenario is characterized by a combination of conflict and adaptability, and is closely intertwined with various problem domains. Furthermore, this underscores the significance of conceptualizing and empirically examining the basic interconnection between indigenous state-society patterns and the international economic system. In the subsequent section, we present an argument in favor of adopting a comprehensive perspective that acknowledges the fundamental role of social and economic institutions, together with the power dynamics inherent within them.

5.1 China in the 21st century

Over the course of the previous two decades, China has experienced an unparalleled surge in its development rate and international commerce. China has emerged as the leading global export economy, with consistent growth in export quantities, which serves as a significant indicator of its economic achievements. Based on the data provided



by the OEC in 2017, Beijing retained its position as the second-largest global importer, with exports amounting to almost US\$ 4 trillion and imports totaling US\$ 1.54 trillion. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is being pushed to implement a modernization and indigenization plan due to the rapid ascendance of China. The Chinese military sector fulfils its own defense requirements and engages in the exportation of diverse military equipment to other developing nations, such as Pakistan, with the aim of generating revenue and enhancing its political sway (Farooq, Khan, & Khan, 2020).

The growing prominence of China as a significant global actor has garnered much interest in recent times. Following the occurrence of the Asian Financial Crisis, China has exhibited an increased level of enthusiasm for engaging in regional cooperation within the East Asian region¹. The development and regional strategy of China have raised growing worries among the international community of states, particularly among the neighbouring countries of China. China has exhibited significant engagement in regional cooperation, prompting varying interpretations among observers. While some perceive this behavior as indicative of a pursuit of regional hegemony, others view it as a strategy aimed at fostering economic interdependence and promoting shared interests. Will the ascent of China be characterized by a greater degree of harmony, or will it potentially jeopardize the security of both the region and the global community? Will the Chinese government utilize its growing military capabilities to reinforce its territorial claims, or will the presence of economic interdependence act as a limiting factor? The increasing prominence of China poses a potential challenge to the prevailing international order, so potentially undermining the supremacy of the international community. Alternatively, the international community may persist in upholding the current international frameworks. Scholars and commentators from the Western academic community have actively participated in vigorous debates surrounding these matters.

Since the late 1970s, there has been an unequivocal and substantial transformation in the dynamics of China's engagement with the global community, mostly driven by internal developments within China. It is evident that this transition has been effectively executed through a range of approaches. At the regional level, it is widely perceived by China's Southeast Asian counterparts that China has established itself as a "good neighbor." Despite initial uncertainties, China has effectively integrated into the regional intergovernmental organizations that have emerged in conjunction with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Taiwan maintains amicable relations with both North Korea and South Korea, and in recent times, there has been a notable enhancement in its relations with Taiwan. Despite the existence of robust economic ties, the political and social interactions between Japan and other nations remain strained, as will be elaborated upon thereafter. This represents a significant flaw in the overall perception of the region. China and its neighboring countries exhibit several notable principles that are shared among them. These principles include a conventional understanding of sovereignty and non-interference, a recognition of the significance of protecting their respective regimes, a commitment to preserving distinct cultural characteristics, and a dedication to fostering collaborative growth through trade and investment. In a broader context, it is often believed that East Asia has a larger inclination towards hierarchical structures and conformity, as opposed to a preference for power equilibrium. Moreover, East Asia tends to priorities notions of autonomy and non-interference at the global level. The aforementioned evidence suggests the existence of a clearly defined regional international society in East Asia (Busan, 2010).

5.1.1 Notion of peaceful development by Hu Jintao

This study addresses a controversial question about Chinese foreign policy: has the Hu leadership steered China's foreign policy in a more assertive, if not aggressive, direction, or has it remained true to Deng Xiaoping's taoguangyanghui policy, which advocates hiding one's strengths and waiting one out? This is controversial since, when Hu Jintao gained office; Chinese diplomacy has been more active and assertive, particularly in the aftermath of the global economic crisis in 2008–2009, despite China's public assurance that it follows Deng's taoguangyanghui approach from the early 1990s. Furthermore it argues that, given its status as a rising power, China's active foreign policy is now a need rather than a luxury. The Hu leadership is still balancing China's taoguangyanghui strategy with its burgeoning role as a global power, despite the fact that this diplomatic activism represents a significant divergence from the doctrine. Finding a balance between maintaining China's denial of being a global power and avoiding conflict with the United States on the one hand, and growing its influence and accepting greater responsibility on the other, is one of the key points of contention in China's foreign policy agenda(Suisheng,2010).

In fact, there has been a great deal of uncertainty over the nature of Hu's influence and, thus, his supposed accomplishments. Hu Jintao appears to be a born-again Communist and a reformer based on his background, which includes his time spent with the Communist Youth League, his nomination as an administrator in Gansu during the height of Maoism, and his call for balanced growth between the coast and the interior to achieve greater equality. However, his entire exercise of authority points to a methodical approach, with prudence at the core of his deeds. Time and again, onlookers have thought that China was poised to enter a new phase of reform, particularly on the eve of party congresses or yearly National Assembly meetings. Hu has not allowed this to occur; instead, he has frequently strengthened restrictions on the speech of social or political criticism. His real contribution is the methodical application of collective Party regulations, which include smooth intra-party election and selection procedures as well as the official recording and summarization of high-level party meetings (Duchâtel&Godement, 2009).

The 1990s saw the emergence of new styles of operation under Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, some of which later coalesced under Hu Jintao. The role of the military has decreased, but that of bureaucrats, professionals, and diplomats in trade, energy, international economic affairs, propaganda, and education has expanded. The Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) supreme leading bodies continue to be the primary hub for decision-making in this field. The necessity to better coordinate the efforts of the various CCP and state organs involved in foreign and security policy, however, has increased due to China's decentralization and globalization as well as the complexity of its growing international interests. For this reason, the CCP leading small groups (foreign affairs, national security, Taiwan, etc.) is becoming increasingly important (Cabestan, 2009).

China's regional design in the context of its geopolitical strategy and economic development is a significant aspect of its overall national planning and governance. The consideration of economic development as a crucial factor in comprehending the coexistence of increased security situations and expanding economic interdependence in Asia should be regarded as a political strategy employed by political elites within their specific political contexts, rather than a consensus indicating widespread acceptance of the notion. The ongoing rivalry between China's Belt and Road Initiative and the United States, Japan, Australia, and India's Free and Open Indo-Pacific initiative serves to affirm and strengthen the trend of utilizing development policies for strategic objectives. This trend is particularly evident in light of the escalating tensions between the United States and China. Simultaneously, it is noteworthy that there exists a cooperative aspect in the prioritization of growth in the Asian region (Masuria, 2021).

Over the past three decades, China has achieved significant advancements in the process of modernizing its military capabilities. Despite the comparatively lesser budgetary commitment by the Chinese government to the aforementioned course, as disclosed in the country's transparency policy, progress has been achieved. This is in contrast to the United States' substantial military funding, which has not been subject to such revelations. In addition to China's economic comeback, the nation has exhibited a growing engagement in diplomatic operations with the objective of fostering peace in regions that have recently experienced conflicts. China's engagement in global affairs, particularly in places such as Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, signifies the political maturation that the nation has attained over time. The aforementioned statement denotes a perceived alteration in the distribution of power among the United States and its allies within the Asia Pacific area (Teixeira, 2019).

The ascendance of the Asian economy, spearheaded by China, has engendered a sense of apprehension among established global powers such as the United States and many European nations. Consequently, the aforementioned nations are vigilant in their efforts to counteract any additional escalation that may potentially undermine the existing state of affairs, or lead to a reconfiguration of power dynamics and global dominance. Given the scarcity of viable alternatives, the United States and its allies find themselves with a restricted range of options to effectively constrain China and mitigate the broader potential risks it presents on the international stage in Asia. The aggressors, driven by desperation, have resorted to implementing unjust economic penalties and bans as a means to hinder the economic development of the targeted regions and countries.

5.2 Engagements with regional states

China's increased participation in multilateral diplomacy in East Asian regional cooperation since the 1990s has been interpreted by realist scholars, including Sutter (2005b) and Kurlantzick (2008), as a deliberate effort to diminish the influence of the United States in East Asia and undermine its alliances in the region. According to their perspective, China's strategic aim in East Asia's regional cooperation entails the displacement of the United States

from the region, ultimately seeking to establish regional dominance. According to Sutter (2005b), China has strategically positioned itself to exclude the United States by actively promoting the Free Trade Agreement with ASEAN (ASEAN-China FTA) and fostering the Asia-only group (ASEAN Plus Three) in collaboration with other East Asian states. Southeast Asia has emerged as a significant region where China has effectively diminished the influence of the United States. Furthermore, Kurlantzick posits that the expansion of China's power in East Asia is occurring at the detriment of the united governments. Consequently, governments in East Asia may face the predicament of having to align themselves with either Washington or Beijing (Kurlantzick, 2007).

The interpretations of China's regional policy in East Asia are characterized by oversimplification and an inability to comprehensively account for its entirety. The domestic decision-making process in China is disregarded. Johnson's argument may have validity: certain individuals in China, specifically those among the hardline factions of the People's Liberation Army or the Ministry of Defense, may view the containment of American influence in East Asia as a strategic imperative in order to further the objectives of the ASEAN Plus Three initiative. Nonetheless, the impetus behind China's inclination towards regional collaboration in East Asia did not originate from the aforementioned individuals, but rather stemmed primarily from China's economic reformers, namely Zhu Ronnie and Wen Jerboa (Johnston, 2003, p.52).

Indeed, this is a prevalent deficiency observed in both realist and liberal viewpoints. The state-centric perspective of realism overlooks the significant impact of domestic politics on Chinese foreign policy. Realists claim that nations are the primary actors in the realm of international politics, asserting that domestic politics has limited influence in this arena. Consequently, realists have challenges when attempting to consistently integrate theories of domestic politics into their analytical framework. In conclusion, proponents of the realism perspective, particularly those who emphasize the perceived threat posed by China, view the rising nation as a disgruntled power that is likely to contest the existing global hegemony. The conclusion reached is premature. Certain individuals inappropriately extrapolate the experiences of other nations and apply them to China, while others erroneously make broad generalizations about China's overarching strategic approach based on a limited analysis of one or two historical dynasties. Moreover, the realist perspective, which primarily emphasizes the role of states, overlooks the significant impact of domestic politics on the international system. Based on the aforementioned study, it becomes evident that realist perspectives, particularly aggressive realism, exhibit an oversimplified approach in elucidating the whole narrative of China's regional strategy in East Asia.

Over the course of the last five years, the Chinese leadership has demonstrated a prudent and effective approach in handling internal nationalism and American unilateralism, to a certain extent, owing in part to their engagement in the anti-terror battle. There are indications that the period of positive relations between the United States and China following the September 11th attacks and the formation of an anti-terrorism coalition has reached its conclusion. The potential reemergence of cyclical turbulence in the Sino-American relationship may occur if the United States adopts a more rigid stance towards China. The potential consequences of this situation could pose a threat to China's objective of achieving a peaceful ascent. At the micro-level, it appears that the United States has exhibited a greater degree of provocation towards China, while the latter has assumed a more defensive stance. However, when examining the broader Sino-U.S. relationship, it is important to include additional factors. From a macro-level perspective, it appears that China could regain control if it were to eliminate the obstacles of communist ideology and authoritarianism. This is because the prevailing belief among Americans is that, according to the philosophy of democratic peace, democratic nations are unlikely to engage in warfare with one another. Hence, in order to establish enduring internal and exterior stability, it is imperative for the CPC to acquire the skill of effectively leveraging democratic principles. Does this proposition equate to requesting a leopard to alter its distinctive markings?

5.3 Economic rise of China

The People's Republic of China is widely recognized as the most populous nation, boasting a population of approximately 1,385 million individuals. China's economy is the second largest globally, ranking closely behind the United States. Over the past three decades, China's economy has experienced significant growth, leading to speculation that it may surpass the American economy in the near future. China is globally recognized as the foremost exporter, consistently upholding a favorable trade surplus with other nations such as the United States, Japan, and numerous European Union member states.

The economic development strategy of the People's Republic of China during the three decades beginning in the early 1950s is characterized by a high rate of capital accumulation at the expense of consumption and the promotion of industry at the expense of agriculture. This paper describes the growth, fluctuations, and the allocation of resources among sectors of the Chinese economy guided by such a development strategy.

5.3.1 The Escalation of Trade Volume and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)

According to the Economic Complexity Index (ECI), China's economy achieved the second-highest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) globally, measured in current US dollars. Additionally, China secured the top position in terms of total exports and the second position in total imports. However, China's GDP per capita, measured in current US dollars, ranked 58th globally. Furthermore, China's economic complexity stood at the 25th position according to the ECI in 2021. China's leading exports consist of computers, integrated circuits, office machine parts, and telephones, with respective export values of \$192 billion, \$158 billion, \$101 billion, and \$53.9 billion. The primary destinations for these exports are the United States, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, and Germany, with export values of \$530 billion, \$323 billion, \$168 billion, \$140 billion, and \$134 billion, respectively. (-41.7%) respectively(The Observatory of Economic Complexity, China, 2023).

Table 5.1:An Assessment to Nominal GDPs (in Billions of US\$)

Country	Current Global Ranking	A comparison of GDPs in 2019 and 2023				Growth Rate
		2019	% Share in Global GDP	Projected in 2023	Projected Ranking	
USA	1	21,482.41	24.4	24,671	1	2.54%
China	2	14,172.20	16.1	19,581	2	6.18%
Japan	3	5,220.57	5.93	5,908	3	0.94%
Germany	4	4,117.07	4.67	4,937	4	1.86%
India	5	2,957.72	3.36	4,330	5	7.44%
France	6	2,844.70	3.23	3,364	6	1.62%
UK	7	2,809.91	3.19	3,257	7	1.49%
Italy	8	2,112.80	2.4	2,396	8	1.03%
Brazil	9	1,929.71	2.19	2,351	9	2.37%
Canada	10	1,820.36	2.07	2,322	10	2.05%

Source: IMF, 2019

Over the course of the past three decades, China has not only sustained a notable economic growth rate, but has also actively asserted its presence in the global trade arena. A prominent indicator of the robust economic growth in Beijing is the continuous upward trend in the quantity of exports to various global regions. Based on the statistical data provided by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), it can be observed that China has the position of the largest export economy globally. In the year 2017, the value of Chinese exports reached approximately US\$ 2.4 trillion, while its imports amounted to 1.54 trillion US dollars, positioning China as the second largest global importer. Therefore, the Chinese economy achieved a favourable trade balance of US\$ 873 billion. According to the OEC Report of 2017, China's gross domestic product (GDP) for the same year amounted to

12.2 trillion US dollars, positioning it as the second largest economy globally, following the United States. The primary categories of Chinese exports encompass broadcasting equipment, computers and their components, office machine components, electronic integrated circuits (ICs), and telephone sets. In contrast, the primary imported goods from China that have the highest rankings are electronics integrated circuits (ICs), petroleum and its derivatives, iron ore, automobiles, motor vehicles, and gold, as reported by the OEC in 2017. The primary recipients of Chinese export commodities are the United States, which accounts for an annual value of US\$ 476 billion. In addition, Chinese exports are also distributed to Far-Eastern nations such as Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, as well as Europe, with a notable emphasis on Germany.

The collective economy of the European Union (EU) undoubtedly exerts a profound influence on worldwide trade and economic activities. The European Union, particularly Germany, France, and Italy, exhibit a significant degree of economic reliance on trans-Atlantic commerce with the United States. In recent decades, there has been a notable expansion of economic relations between the country in question and China, as well as other global partners. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), often known as the "New Silk Road," can be interpreted as a representation of the economic interdependence between China and the European Union (EU).

Significant source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in nations with abundant natural resources are Chinese state-owned companies (SOEs). Concerns regarding SOEs' potential to subvert liberal economic practices and change domestic governance in the nations in which they invest have been sparked by their expansion throughout the Western Hemisphere. With an analysis of Chinese state-owned enterprise investment in Canada's hydrocarbon industry, this article adds to the ongoing discussion. The study employs a critical analysis of existing research on the effects of state-of-the-art (SOE) investment on a Western Hemisphere host country. Some contend that Canada's cautious approach to SOE investment has created opportunities for institutional innovation and strengthened rules governing SOEs' foreign direct investment. Stricter rules, as I suggest, may inadvertently have the opposite impact while being misconstrued as an attempt to promote liberal economic activities(Ufimtseva,2020).

5.3.2 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank(AIIB)

The AIIB, also known as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, is a multilateral development bank that was established in 2014. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is an international organization founded by China, aimed at promoting sustainable infrastructure development and regional connectivity in Asia. The primary objective of the bank is to provide substantial investment money for energy, maritime, and land channels across many countries, with a particular focus on the Eurasian region. Additionally, the objective is to foster regional collaboration and partnership in order to effectively tackle forthcoming development obstacles and establish an atmosphere of enhanced engagement with prominent bilateral and international development organizations. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is a significant milestone as the first financial institution originating from a non-Western context. Its establishment is attributed to the proactive efforts of China, a developing economic powerhouse. The multinational organization in question comprises a total of 84 member states, with 48 of them being regional countries and the remaining 36 being non-regional countries. Among these member states, 14 are part of the European Union. The AIIB possesses financial assets exceeding US\$ 100 billion, comprising a paid-in portion of 20 percent and a callable portion of 80 percent. Notably, the largest shareholders of AIIB include China, India, Russia, and Germany.

The establishment of the AIIB has the potential to significantly transform the financing landscape for global infrastructure networks, hence impacting multidimensional growth. The initial indications suggest that China's motivation for undertaking the project extends beyond economic development, encompassing broader political objectives in the Eurasian region. The bank plays a crucial role in facilitating Beijing's efforts to rejuvenate and invigorate the newly established "Silk Road," which serves as an important link between Asia and Europe. Furthermore, this observation highlights the increased economic importance of emerging markets as a whole, with particular emphasis on the significant role played by China.

The AIIB, in conjunction with other prominent initiatives launched by China, presently possesses a combined capital base of approximately US\$ 250 billion, a sum that is approximately equal to that of the World Bank. The establishment of transnational institutions can be seen as a response to the increasing dissatisfaction of emerging global powers with the current global institutions, as well as the expanding economic influence of China. As one of the leading global economies, Beijing has expressed dissatisfaction with its perceived lack of representation in international financial institutions, particularly the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. China

and other emerging economies express dissatisfaction with their limited influence in key international organizations (IOs) and are also discontented with the slow progress of reforms aimed at resolving imbalanced practices. Hence, it can be argued that the AIIB has the potential to serve as a catalyst for regional economic growth and the advancement of infrastructure projects. Nevertheless, the establishment of the Bank might potentially serve as a means for China to further its broader geopolitical objectives on both regional and global scales. Consequently, the United States and Japan have exhibited hesitancy in their willingness to participate in this endeavor.

5.4 The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a significant international development strategy proposed by the Chinese government. The primary strategic document of China pertaining to the BRI is "Vision and Actions on Jointly Building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road," which was officially released in March 2015. As emphasized in the aforementioned document, the BRI is designed to facilitate the systematic and unrestricted movement of economic elements, optimize the allocation of resources, and foster extensive market integration. It aims to encourage participating countries along the Belt and Road to achieve harmonized economic policies and engage in more comprehensive and profound regional cooperation of elevated standards. Furthermore, it seeks to collaboratively establish an open, inclusive, and equitable regional economic cooperation framework that yields advantages for all stakeholders. The definition of BRI provided in the document is comprehensive in scope and can be effectively applied across various contexts. Since 2013, China has been actively engaged in the promotion of BRI projects inside the Central Asian region. Nevertheless, the lack of universally recognized definitions or definitive criteria for categorizing projects as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) remains a challenge. Chinese projects in Central Asia are considered as part of the BRI if they meet the specified requirements (Wakulchuk and all ,2019).

When Xi Jinping, the leader of China's party and state, initially introduced his proposal for a "Silk Road Economic Belt" and "21st Century Maritime Silk Road" in the autumn of 2013, the concept was ambiguous and its substance posed challenges in terms of interpretation. While this assertion holds validity in various aspects, it is worth noting that the BRI, as it is currently referred to as the overarching strategy, has subsequently been further elaborated upon in two policy documents. Within these documents, the Chinese authorities delineate extensive and highly ambitious objectives. Beijing aims to establish connectivity among the infrastructure of the countries involved, while also urging them to liberalize their markets for China's benefit and promote trade. Additionally, the authorities seek to establish connections between the participating countries' financial markets and those of China, enhance societal relations, and even synchronize their overall economic development policies with China's. The implementation of projects on the ground serves as a reliable gauge for assessing Beijing's strategies in attaining these objectives.

According to the MERICS BRI database, China has allocated over 100 billion USD towards infrastructure projects related to the BRI since its inception. Excluded from consideration are projects that are now undergoing construction or are in the preliminary planning stage, which entail significantly higher levels of expenditure. The provided map illustrates several infrastructure projects, namely those pertaining to railroads, pipelines, and ports. Projects within these domains typically garner significant media coverage, although they may not necessarily entail the most substantial financial commitments. The MERICS Belt and Road Initiative tracker is a continuous collection of studies and mappings that monitors investments in several sectors, including power generation and transmission, as well as digital and financial infrastructure, among others.

The BRI of China, widely recognized as the most extensive infrastructure undertaking globally, has primarily allocated expenditures towards energy and transit networks across Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Since its inception, the BRI has seen substantial transformations in terms of its magnitude, participants, and areas of investment. Furthermore, it continues to adapt and develop, particularly in response to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, there has been a lack of a methodical and all-encompassing examination of the potential appearance of the BRI in the medium-term future, namely in the year 2035. This gap persists despite the growing body of scholarly writing on the subject. In order to fill this void in existing research, we aim to bridge the gap by utilising a scenario method that incorporates a 2×2 matrix. This approach is informed by the findings obtained from about 40 qualitative interviews conducted with individuals representing various sectors including commercial, non-profit, and public sectors in China and nations participating in the BRI.

Additionally, this research is supplemented by a thorough examination of press and academic papers through desk research. The conceptualization of the BRI is closely linked to its level of economic globalization and multilateralism, both of which are influenced by the global response to the pandemic. The four scenarios, namely Asian, Vibrant, Irrelevant, and International BRI, illustrate the diverse range of development possibilities associated with the geographical breadth, investment quantities and sectors, funding structure, and sustainability orientation of BRI. The potential trajectories of the BRI in the aftermath of the pandemic could offer valuable insights for commercial and political leaders, enabling them to effectively plan and adapt their responses and plans. The aforementioned scenarios possess the potential to contribute to the scholarly discourse regarding the conceptualization of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as well as furnish a qualitative foundation for forthcoming quantitative effect evaluations (Schulhoff, Vuren, & Kircher, 2022).

5.5.1 The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) can be characterized as a regional political and security structure in Eurasia, primarily spearheaded by China and supported by Russia. The fundamental aim of the SCO was to uphold regional stability and foster collaboration among its member states in countering terrorism and other security challenges. Due to its increasing importance in the Eurasian region, the SCO is commonly referred to as the "Eastern alliance." The organization is often regarded as the largest regional entity globally, both in terms of its extensive geographical coverage and its population size. It encompasses over 50 percent of the Eurasian landmass, as well as a significant portion of the world's population and energy supplies. The emergence of a formidable alliance in the Eastern region, with China and Russia assuming prominent positions, presents a significant challenge for the United States within the contemporary global order of the 21st century.

In the realm of international politics following the events of 9/11, it is notable that the territories encompassing the member countries of the SCO experienced significant impacts from acts of terrorism. During the "War on Terror," several individuals made the independent decision to cooperate with the NATO forces led by the United States. In fact, a small number of these individuals provided military and logistical assistance to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Nevertheless, the extended duration of the American presence and its expanding influence in the region began to evoke apprehension in Beijing and Moscow. Consequently, they made the strategic choice to revitalize the framework of the SCO, assigning it a more prominent role in the collective effort to combat terrorism. The comprehensive examination of the SCO highlights its distinctive inter-state alliance, which serves as an institutional framework for fostering larger regional collaboration in areas such as economics, politics, security, and culture. The given model demonstrates a remarkable example of regionalism within the current dynamics of the Eurasian zone.

In light of the evolving dynamics of the global order in the 21st century, the SCO has attained a position of great significance both regionally and globally. The primary developing powers, namely China and Russia, are crucial constituents of this alliance, characterized by a more robust and diversified collaboration. The BRI, launched by the Chinese government, aims to enhance connectivity among its member countries as well as with Western Europe. Primarily, the SCO endeavors to achieve shared political and security goals, while also striving to identify the most effective means of enhancing economic cooperation, fostering cultural connections, and promoting humanitarian exchanges among its member states. The establishment of the SCO represents a potentially groundbreaking instance of transnational collaboration through the formation of alliances that are characterized by equal partnerships among states of varying sizes, levels of political influence, economic potentials, and cultural and civilizational attributes. The vast geographical expanse of the SCO has the potential to enhance the probability of a highly interconnected Eurasian continent, serving as a focal point for global energy resources and densely populated regions. The SCO will undoubtedly offer a shared platform for member states to strengthen their strategic relationships, which is likely to cause concern among Western nations, particularly the United States. However, it is possible that this optimistic scenario may face challenges in the future. Conflicts of interest and rivalries among various members of the SCO, such as India-China and India-Pakistan, might potentially disrupt its operations.

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